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Stealth Risks of Regulating Stealth Marketing: A
Comment on Ellen Goodman’s Stealth Marketing
and Editorial Integrity
Eric Goldman*
Professor Ellen Goodman’s article, Stealth Marketing and Editorial
Integrity, addresses the regulation of marketing that disguises itself as
editorial content, which the article refers to as “stealth marketing.” In an era
of information overload and hypercommercialism, stealth marketing has
become a common way for marketers to garner scarce consumer attention.
With its growing ubiquity, stealth marketing has attracted considerable
attention from academics, commentators, and consumers.
Sponsorship disclosure laws—requiring marketers/publishers to
disclose when content is marketing—can be used to regulate stealth
marketing, and they are in fact used in broadcasting media. Yet, despite their
potentially important policy role, sponsorship disclosure laws get
surprisingly little academic attention.
Professor Goodman tackles this deficiency in the literature by
considering how sponsorship disclosure can be a useful policy tool. The
article argues that the implicit deception in stealth marketing produces
negative externalities by degrading consumer trust in all content they receive.
The article then concludes that sponsorship disclosure laws can correct this
negative externality and proposes that sponsorship disclosure laws (currently
applicable only to a few media) be extended to more media.
These conclusions are intuitively attractive. It is human nature to want
to know more rather than less, and in this situation it is very pragmatic to
require publishers and marketers simply to tell us when they are engaged in
marketing. Even a libertarian might favor this regulation because it increases
transparency that helps consumers make smarter marketplace decisions.
Nevertheless, this Comment will explore some possible adverse
consequences of sponsorship disclosure laws. If Goodman’s article is
premised on the need to correct negative externalities, these consequences
also must be factored into the deliberations, which may suggest the need for
further doctrinal and empirical research on the merits and disadvantages of
sponsorship disclosure laws.

* Assistant Professor and Director, High Tech Law Institute, Santa Clara University School of
Law. Email: egoldman@gmail.com. Website: http://www.ericgoldman.org. These comments are
based on the March 1, 2006 draft of Professor Goodman’s article. I explore some of these
observations in more detail in my forthcoming article, A Coasean Analysis of Marketing, 2006 WIS.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
912524.
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Why Do Consumers Care if Content is Marketing?

Consumer attitudes toward marketing can be dichotomous and hard to
reconcile. Calfee & Ringold1 (in a study cited by Professor Goodman)
highlighted this confusion in their review of many consumer surveys
conducted between the 1920s and the 1980s. Synthesizing the consistent
findings of these surveys, Calfee & Ringold paradoxically concluded that
70% of consumers think that marketing is often untruthful and seeks to
persuade people to buy things they do not want,2 but 70% of consumers also
think that marketing is useful for information.3
Dichotomous findings like this raise some thorny issues for policymakers. When can regulators rely on consumer opinions about marketing,
and how should inconsistent opinions be accounted for?
With this in mind, we should reconsider the universally recognized fact
that consumers say that they want to know when content is marketing. Given
conflicting consumer attitudes toward marketing, it may not be prudent to
base policy on this fact in isolation. More importantly, this fact masks an
underlying issue of significant import. We know what consumers say they
want, but we do not know why consumers want this—why do consumers care
about distinguishing between marketing and editorial content, and how will
consumers change their behavior in response to such disclosure? Without
understanding consumers’ motivations for wanting to know, or knowing
what they will do with the disclosure, there is no way to tell if sponsorship
disclosure laws actually achieve the desired outcome.
Thus, the article attempts to address the manifestations of a problem
(consumers want to know the status of content) without addressing the source
of that problem (why they want to know). Responding to manifestations of a
problem, without correcting the root problem, may lead to unsatisfying
results—and, as this Comment will explore, may create new and unexpected
problems.
II.

Does Disclosure Help—or Hurt—Consumers?

Clearly, consumers value marketing. In fact, in some cases consumers
value marketing content as much or more than editorial content. For
example, consumers regularly rate the utility of paid Internet search results
(such as “sponsored links”) as equal to or better than unpaid search results
generated by the search engine’s algorithms.4 In one survey, 75% of
consumers felt this way.5

1. John E. Calfee & Debra J. Ringold, The 70% Majority: Enduring Consumer Beliefs About
Advertising, 13 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 228 (1994).
2. Id. at 236.
3. Id. at 233.
4. See, e.g., ICROSSING, HOW AMERICA SEARCHES 11 fig.17 (2005) (reporting that 49% either
preferred sponsored search results or were indifferent between editorial search results and sponsored
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Yet, consumer distrust toward marketing is so strong that consumers
often disregard marketing without assessing its actual utility to them. The
“advertising” label is a powerful disclosure; it can single-handedly cause
consumers to overlook content they would have otherwise found meritorious.
A 2005 study by Jansen and Resnick6 illustrates this risk. Consumers
were shown multiple sets of Internet search results, some of which were
labeled advertising. Although the search results substantively were the same,
consumers rated the unlabeled search results as more relevant than the
labeled results.7 In other words, the advertising label single-handedly
degraded the consumers’ relevancy assessment even though the search
results had the same level of relevancy.8
The risk of consumer overresponse to marketing labels poses an
interesting policy conundrum. Superficially, the populist approach would be
to give consumers what they want (to know when content is marketing). Yet,
this approach has the risk of counterproductively and systematically
increasing consumers’ erroneous content assessments, which in turn may
hurt consumers’ ability to get content they would find useful. At minimum,
any cost–benefit analysis of sponsorship disclosure laws should account for
the costs of these errors.
III. Obscure Disclosures vs. Noisy Disclosures
Assuming that mandatory sponsorship disclosures are cost–benefit
justified, the article does not address how the disclosures should be presented
to consumers. Yet, the mechanical details are crucial to the efficacy of any
proposed solution.
If forced to make unwanted disclosures, publishers can do so halfheartedly by burying sponsorship disclosure in such an obscure location that
reasonable consumers probably will not see it. This may very well describe
search results); IPROSPECT, SEARCH ENGINE USER ATTITUDES 18–20 (2004), available at
http://www.iprospect.com/premiumPDFs/iProspectSurveyComplete.pdf (illustrating that users of
the MSN search engine found paid search advertisements more useful than editorial search results
and that users of the AOL search engine found paid search advertisements at least as useful as
editorial search results)
5. See Stefanie Olsen, Software Tool Smothers Sponsored Search, NEWS.COM, Nov. 14, 2003,
http://news.com.com/2102-1032_3-5107846.html (citing a survey finding that 24% found
sponsored search results more useful than editorial search results and 51% found them just as
useful).
6. See Bernard J. Jansen & Marc Resnick, Examining Searcher Perceptions of and Interactions
with Sponsored Results (June 5, 2005), available at http://www.ist.psu.edu/faculty_pages/jjansen/
academic/pubs/jansen_ecommerce_workshop.pdf.
7. See Press Release, Penn State University, Consumers Suspicious of Sponsored Links (June
10, 2005), http://live.psu.edu/story/12348 (“While study participants rated 52 percent of the organic
results as ‘relevant,’ searchers described 42 percent of sponsored links as ‘relevant’ even though
both sets of results were identical.”).
8. Id. (stating that “[E]ven when the returned results are exactly the same, people still view
what they thought of as the organic results as better [than the advertising results].” (quoting
Professor Jim Jansen)).
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the typical implementations by broadcasters today. For example, television
broadcasts often disclose sponsorships in the end-of-show credits that are
effectively invisible to most consumers. Consumers typically have little
reason to read credits carefully, and even if they tried, it may be challenging
to read the small type as it scrolls quickly and is obscured by the
broadcaster’s allocation of screen space to other promotions. If consumers
do not notice obscure sponsorship disclosures, the disclosures cannot
produce the positive benefits that the article seeks.
Further, sponsorship disclosures may be made after the consumer has
formed an opinion about the content (such as in end-of-show credits, after the
consumer has watched the entire show). I have not seen any empirical
analysis of the consequences of after-the-fact sponsorship disclosures, but
based on analogous psychological principles such as framing, ex post
disclosures may not fully correct any misassessments of the content made by
consumers.
Thus, to achieve the sought-after policy benefits, sponsorship
disclosures may need to be noticed by consumers and disclosed early in
consumers’ content experience. I call these “noisy disclosures.” Noisy
disclosures solve the obscurity problem but create at least two new ones.
First, many consumers already suffer from information overload. Yet,
noisy disclosures consume more of their already-strapped attention. Some
consumers will feel that the disclosed information is valuable enough that
they will not mind the “cost” of having their attention consumed, but others
will resent the imposition. For the latter consumers, the mandated disclosure
becomes another form of spam (unwanted content).
Ironically, mandated sponsorship disclosures could create a negative
externality analogous to the one that the article attributes to stealth
marketing. The article argues that stealth marketing degrades consumer trust
in otherwise-trustworthy content. Similarly, to the extent that consumers do
not find mandated sponsorship disclosures valuable to them, they will tune
them out. Further, if consumers routinely find mandated disclosures
unhelpful, they may be inclined to adopt an across-the-board heuristic to tune
out mandated disclosures, even if those disclosures are socially valuable.
Thus, as disclosures generally become noisier, consumers may increasingly
become disinterested in all of them—a different negative externality than the
one identified by the article, but problematic nonetheless.
Second, as discussed above, noisier disclosures should increase the
number of consumers who see the disclosure and use it to make erroneous
categorization judgments about the marketing. Indeed, this effect may
support a self-reinforcing feedback loop. By mandating sponsorship
disclosures, the government communicates to consumers that they should
care about the distinctions between editorial and marketing content. Thus,
consumers may care about the editorial–marketing divide because the
government has mandated disclosure, while the government may mandate
disclosure because consumers say they care about the divide. When the
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government makes disclosures louder, it may simply be ratcheting up the
communicative import of the message, heightening consumer sensitivity to
the sponsorship disclosure and magnifying the risk of erroneous consumer
reactions to the disclosure.
IV. Conclusion
As the Calfee & Ringold study indicates, most consumers view
marketing suspiciously. Among many possible reasons, consumers suspect
that marketers are manipulating them to make unwanted choices for the
marketer’s profits. Stealth marketing represents the natural evolution of
those fears about manipulation; the surreptitious nature of stealth marketing
only heightens the perception that marketers are doing something improper.
As Justice Brandeis has said, “Sunlight is . . . the best of disinfectants,”9 so
unmasking stealth marketing seems like an ideal way to curb such untoward
behavior by marketers.
But marketing’s bad reputation is partially undeserved. Marketing can
educate consumers, help them make better decisions, and improve
marketplace competition in a way that benefits all consumers (even those not
exposed to the marketing). So the question remains: on balance, are we
better off if marketing is transparent?
Professor Goodman’s article posits an explanation why transparency is
important. But as this Comment has explored, transparency creates new
additional costs that need to be considered. The net effect of these
theoretical considerations is indeterminate, making it hard to generate
reliable policy recommendations.
Despite this, the article makes one point that I wholeheartedly agree
with. Unless some empirical data indicate that consumers do, in fact,
evaluate stealth marketing differently based on the medium used to deliver it,
sponsorship disclosure rules should not differ by media. However, this
insight may support an across-the-board rollback of the rules rather than an
expansion of them.

9. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY – AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 62
(Richard M. Abrams ed., Harper & Row 1967) (1914).

